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The process for approving new drugs for type 2 diabetes illustrates the significant 
shortcomings of the regulatory standards for licensing, reimbursing, and adopting new drugs. 
Regulatory reform is needed to improve the real-world therapeutic value of anti-diabetic 
drugs.  
 
 
Background 
The overarching aim of drug regulation is to ensure that only effective and safe treatments 
reach patients. Ideally, regulatory decisions are based on good quality data from large trials 
measuring real-world, patient-centred outcomes. Licensing agencies, however, routinely 
permit the market entry of treatments on the basis of small placebo-controlled trials 
evaluating short-term, surrogate endpoints in selected populations. Consequently, medicines 
are commonly prescribed in the absence of good quality data on their long-term benefits and 
harms.1,2 Current licensing standards are inadequate to predict the real-world therapeutic 
value of new medications.3 
 
This is particularly problematic for preventive treatments given to large populations, which 
should be subject to a high standard of proof of benefit, and absence of significant harm. 
These drugs present interesting challenges, firstly because the real-world benefits often take 
many years to arise, and secondly because those benefits are often modest, although 
clinically significant. Trials should quantify the benefits and harms for the various populations 
that will use these drugs, ideally using pre-specified subgroups of sufficient size. This would 
provide clinicians and patients with dependable knowledge for shared decision-making.   
 
In this paper, we focus on the regulatory appraisal and approval of new drugs for type 2 
diabetes mellitus. Diabetes is a common condition that requires long-term pharmacotherapy. 
The global prevalence of diabetes was an estimated 347 million people in 2008, and it is 
expected to rise exponentially over the next decades.4 With more than 30 anti-diabetic 
agents available on the market, the process for licensing new drugs for diabetes highlights 
the salient shortcomings of the evidence standards for licensing, reimbursing, and adopting 
new preventive drugs. Blood glucose lowering is the only benchmark used by regulatory 
agencies to grant market approval to anti-diabetic drugs (Box 1). For most anti-diabetic 
drugs in current use, there is insufficient evidence from randomised trials about their long-
term clinical benefits or harms. We propose and discuss two alternative regulatory models 
for remedying this situation.  
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Time to curb regulatory enthusiasm for “timely market access”  
The low bar for market entry set by licensing agencies, coupled with a quickly expanding 
diabetes economy created by guidelines, targets, and the rapidly rising prevalence of 
diabetes in emerging markets, encourages pharmaceutical firms to develop ever-increasing 
numbers of glucose-lowering therapies. There are currently over 200 molecules in the 
development pipeline.5,6 In recent years, “timely market access” has become a regulatory 
orthodoxy that has led to a substantial reduction in the review times for drug applications.7 
This facilitates widespread use of treatments without adequate data on their risk-benefit 
ratio, and reduces the market incentive for high quality evidence. Over the past two decades, 
there has been an increase in drug withdrawals and black-box warnings.8,9 The glucose-
lowering drug rosiglitazone highlights the need for regulatory reform.10 Initially heralded as a 
breakthrough drug, rosiglitazone was later found to increase the risk of cardiovascular 
adverse events and was withdrawn from European markets in 2010.11,12   
 
We outline two alternative regulatory strategies that could improve the real-world therapeutic 
value of anti-diabetic drugs. Both strategies require long-term data on patient-centred 
outcomes in a timely manner to allow clinicians and patients to make informed decisions. 
Each strategy has important advantages and disadvantages (Table), and each carries 
significant administrative and financial costs. These costs should be weighed against the 
health benefits of a future scenario in which the only anti-diabetic agents used in clinical 
practice are those that have demonstrable effects on clinical outcomes – the sole purpose of 
preventive treatment. Our proposals are relevant to other preventive medications taken by 
large numbers of asymptomatic individuals for long periods of time. These strategies should 
be considered alongside other approaches aimed at generating and disseminating evidence 
for more informed patients and clinicians (Box 2). 
 
Raising the bar for market entry by licensing agencies 
The first potential strategy is to raise the evidence standards for approving new drugs by 
licensing agencies.13-16 Licensing agencies in the US (FDA) and Europe (EMA) usually 
require only small trials enrolling 2,000-3,000 patients, and few of these patients are studied 
for longer than six months. These trials also rarely include key target groups for prescription 
in everyday clinical practice, namely the elderly patients with multimorbidities who are most 
likely to receive anti-diabetic medications.17 By excluding such populations, the current 
regulatory environment results in de facto testing of new drugs in actual clinical practice. 
Also, pivotal trials rarely provide the necessary information about the relative benefits and 
harms of new versus older agents.13,18  
 
Raising the bar at point of market entry would require firms to conduct large, active-
comparator trials of new agents versus existing ones, measuring outcomes in real-world 
populations. Under this strategy, regulators would require trials lasting longer than current 
phase 3 trials, most of which measure only surrogate endpoints. Such trials would need to 
be simple pragmatic trials, recruiting patients who are likely to use the drug in clinical 
settings, and allowing providers to optimise treatment according to patients’ needs – and not 
according to strict protocols.19 This would provide realistic and timely estimates of the 
comparative effectiveness of new anti-diabetic agents.  
 
It is often important to have several drug options available on the market to allow clinicians 
and patients to make shared decisions based on individual characteristics, responses, side 
effects, and preferences. Requiring comparative evidence at the time of market approval 
need not mean that only drugs demonstrating superiority over existing alternatives are 
approved.18 Timely comparisons of new and existing agents may, however, deter the market 
entry of dramatically inferior or harmful drugs.  
 
Future trials would need to evaluate outcomes that matter to patients and their caregivers – 
collectively known as “patient-centred outcomes.” According to Guyatt and colleagues, a 
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patient-centred outcome must meet the following test: “Were it to be the only thing that 
changed, patients would be willing to undergo a treatment with associated risk, cost, or 
inconvenience.”20 Among such outcomes, reduction in death is of the highest significance; 
others include myocardial infarction, stroke, loss of vision, renal failure, amputation, 
neuropathy, and erectile dysfunction. Other key outcomes that influence patient 
independence, function, and quality of life are drug-related harms. Clinical trial publications 
generally fail to report adequate data on the timing, severity, and frequency of such harms, 
hindering a meaningful evaluation of long-term safety. Such outcomes should be routinely 
reported in a standardized fashion in future publications.   
 
Since 2008, the FDA has asked pharmaceutical companies to demonstrate the 
cardiovascular neutrality of new anti-diabetic medications before they can be granted full 
market approval. The FDA considers new anti-diabetic drugs to have cardiovascular 
neutrality if the upper boundary of the 95% confidence interval for the hazard ratio is <1.3; if 
it is between 1.3 and 1.8, approval is conditional on post-marketing evidence. This is a major 
step in the right direction. But by falling short of requiring evidence of cardiovascular benefit, 
the FDA may indirectly discourage companies from investing in large trials to demonstrate 
such benefit.21 The regulatory agencies also rarely follow up on companies that have agreed 
to do post-licensing, cardiovascular safety studies.22 Requiring evidence of cardiovascular 
safety prior to approval would ensure that new drugs with no proven safety record are not 
widely used upon market entry. Research has shown that it is difficult to shift established 
prescribing patterns, even when new data from well-publicised studies become available.23  
 
Pharmaceutical companies often contend that having to demonstrate cardiovascular benefit 
would set an unreasonably high hurdle for the development of new therapies. However, 
there is no evidence that raising the bar for market entry of new medications by licensing 
agencies deters innovation in the sector or hinders anti-diabetic drug development.16,21 
Nevertheless, licensing agencies are considering moving towards an adaptive licensing 
model, whereby approval is based on iterative phases of evidence generation and regulatory 
assessment24 although the details of such adaptive mechanisms are unclear. The premise of 
adaptive licensing is to tolerate greater uncertainty at the time of approval to allow for early 
patient access to new drugs while further delaying the generation of long-term evidence until 
after market entry. While this process may be valid for severe, fast progressing, and life-
threatening conditions for which no successful or safe treatment exists (e.g., rapidly fatal 
malignancies), given the number of agents already available, many of which have 
themselves not yet been adequately assessed for their impact on patient-centred outcomes, 
there is no pressing need for accelerated access to new glucose-lowering drugs for type 2 
diabetes. There is therefore no reason why the FDA and EMA should tolerate a high degree 
of uncertainty about the long-term benefits and harms of such drugs. 
 
Raising the bar for market entry by health technology assessment agencies 
Licensing agencies are not alone in permitting anti-diabetic medications to enter the market 
on the basis of weak evidence. Many European countries have national health technology 
assessment (HTA) bodies, which provide evidence to support payer and prescriber 
decisions on the adoption, reimbursement, and use of new drugs. These organisations are 
expected to block market entry for products that do not provide genuine long-term benefits.25 
Therefore a second potential strategy to improve the regulation of anti-diabetic medications 
is to raise the standards of evidence required for approval by HTA agencies.  
 
The current regulatory environment poses significant challenges for HTA bodies, such as the 
UK National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE). Although NICE ostensibly has 
higher standards of evidence (e.g., real-world clinical data) than licensing agencies, it has 
limited resources and powers to enforce the conduct of new clinical studies.26 In the absence 
of meaningful long-term data, NICE often depends on mathematical models of clinical and 
cost-effectiveness to approve or reject the market entry of new medicines. Such models 
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generally extrapolate from the short-term trial findings previously submitted to licensing 
agencies, and medicines are often approved based on impacts on surrogate markers such 
as glycaemia and body weight, despite significant remaining uncertainty about the long-term 
effects.  
 
The second regulatory strategy would maintain the existing evidence standards within 
licensing agencies, but would ensure that new drugs for type 2 diabetes are approved by 
HTA agencies only when there is evidence of clear benefit on endpoints that are important to 
patients. This strategy would require manufacturers to gather evidence on real-world 
effectiveness, and it would minimise the number of patients exposed unnecessarily to 
uncertainty or harm.  
 
A key component of this strategy would be determining the fate of new drugs while evidence 
on real-world effectiveness and safety is emerging. HTA agencies may need to sign 
“managed entry agreements” with pharmaceutical companies to hedge against uncertainties 
at the time of market approval regarding long-term clinical effects.27,28 These schemes grant 
companies market access in return for achieving outcome targets (e.g., cardiovascular 
benefits). Over the past few years, such schemes have become more common in Europe 
and the US.29,30 
 
Managed entry agreements can take many forms and can be incorporated into novel 
regulatory pathways, including adaptive licensing. For example, a new anti-diabetic 
medication could be “Approved for Randomisation” whereby the HTA agency asks a 
pharmaceutical company to gather more evidence about the long-term cardiovascular 
benefits and harms of its product – relative to other drugs in the same therapeutic class – in 
low-cost, head-to-head randomised trials.31 It is increasingly feasible to embed such simple 
trials in clinical practice, with follow-up data on real-world outcomes such as myocardial 
infarction, or death, extracted from routinely collected administrative data and electronic 
health records.32 Any clinician or patient seeking to access a new diabetes medication which 
currently lacks adequate evidence of benefit could be requested to specify the treatment 
option they would have used before the drug was approved. The patient would then be 
randomly assigned to receive the new drug or the active, standard-of-care comparator. 
 
Depending on the configuration of the health service or insurance scheme, the agency may 
choose to fully or partly reimburse the medicine during the period of evidence collection, and 
subsequently re-assess its decision. If a treatment does demonstrate the benefits predicted 
by the company, then the drug can simply be upgraded to full HTA approval. If a treatment 
fails to meet the pre-specified targets (e.g., equivalent benefits and harms with existing 
agents on long-term outcomes), the agency could then: decline to pay the withheld portion of 
procurement costs for the drug; invite the company to decrease the price to reflect the 
poorer outcomes; downgrade the drug to HTA-unapproved; or suggest withdrawal of the 
drug from the market.  
 
Managed entry agreements, however, have limitations. At present, changing the coverage 
status of a previously-reimbursed drug – or withdrawing an already approved product – can 
pose significant political challenges for HTA agencies.30 Such agreements may also be 
operationally complex, costly, and difficult to implement. However, efforts are underway to 
improve the data infrastructure to collect valid information on relevant outcomes. Previous 
managed entry agreements have relied on observational designs to collect information on 
long-term outcomes. Post-approval data collection mechanisms considered for novel 
adaptive licensing models similarly rely on registries, cohorts, and other observational 
studies rather than reliable randomised trial data.24,33 The limited experience from the US 
and UK suggests that, in the absence of randomisation, it is difficult to attribute observed 
differences in patient outcomes to the different drugs received.34 Randomising patients into 
different drug groups would significantly improve the validity of studies on which managed 
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entry agreements are based.35  
 
Conclusion 
By accepting glucose-lowering as the primary yardstick by which to evaluate the 
effectiveness of new drugs for diabetes, regulators currently send the wrong signal to 
decision makers in health systems. It is wrong to imply to clinicians and patients that any 
drug that successfully lowers glucose levels will also achieve meaningful reductions in risk of 
patient-relevant micro- and macrovascular outcomes, unless this assertion has been reliably 
demonstrated for that specific agent in clinical trials.   
 
There is a need to identify a feasible and cost-effective approach for both regulators and 
pharmaceutical companies that incentivises the production of new drugs and practical 
evidence. We suggest that one simple question should guide all decisions made by 
regulators, doctors, payers, patients, and policy-makers faced with new anti-diabetic drug 
applications: do we have clear evidence that this drug improves the outcomes that matter to 
patients?  
 
Key Points 
 Regulators permit glucose lowering drugs onto the market with suboptimal evidence 
which is inadequate to inform patients, clinicians, regulators, and payers. 
 HTA bodies such as NICE then facilitate the use of such drugs, again without 
incentivising the production of good quality evidence.  
 Better regulatory strategies are needed to generate long-term data on clinical outcomes 
in a timely manner.  
 The first potential strategy is to raise the standards of evidence for approving new anti-
diabetes drugs by licensing agencies.  
 The second potential strategy is to raise the bar for covering and reimbursing new anti-
diabetes drugs by health technology assessment agencies.  
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Box 1. The link between glucose control and diabetic complications 
 
It is important to examine the relationship between glucose control and diabetic 
complications.  
 
Type 2 diabetes mellitus and its complications: 
 Type 2 diabetes is defined by a particular threshold of blood glucose, and it is 
characterised by an increased risk of adverse health outcomes caused by vascular 
damage.  
 Macrovascular complications of diabetes include coronary artery disease, peripheral 
arterial disease, and stroke; these are responsible for the vast majority of early deaths 
among people with diabetes.  
 Microvascular complications include nephropathy, neuropathy, and retinopathy.36  
 
Is there a strong link between blood glucose and diabetes complications? 
 Complications of diabetes show a correlation with blood glucose levels, which is stronger 
for microvascular than for macrovascular complications.  
 The correlation between blood glucose levels and complications has led to the 
widespread acceptance for blood glucose lowering as a valid surrogate measure of 
diabetes-related micro- and macrovascular adverse events. 
 Existing evidence shows that levels of cholesterol and blood pressure are stronger risk 
factors for several macrovascular outcomes in diabetes than blood glucose levels.37  
 
Are anti-diabetic medications effective in reducing the risk of complications? 
 While effective in reducing the risk of microvascular complications, most of the drugs 
currently used to lower blood glucose levels have not been shown in randomised trials to 
reduce the rates of macrovascular complications.38-40  
 In fact, treatment with anti-hypertensives or statins leads to larger reductions in 
cardiovascular risk than treatment with anti-diabetic medications.  
 Intensified glucose lowering also has a greater negative impact on quality of life than 
lowering cholesterol or blood pressure.41  
 Several anti-diabetic drugs have been found to increase the risk of cardiovascular 
complications.11,38,42-44   
 The net benefits of available anti-diabetic medications are generally modest, and vary 
widely depending on individual characteristics and preferences.45  
 There is growing evidence that the harms of tightly controlling blood glucose in the 
elderly often outweigh the benefits, with hypoglycaemia now overtaking hyperglycaemia 
as a cause for hospital admission in this group.46 
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Box 2. Beyond regulation: better dissemination and informed decision-makers 
 
Physicians and patients often have exaggerated expectations of drug benefits47,48 Undue 
regulatory emphasis on blood glucose-lowering may mislead patients into concluding that 
efforts aimed at reducing levels of this surrogate endpoint will successfully lower their risk of 
important macrovascular outcomes.  
 
What can be done beyond regulation to remedy this situation?  
 Clearer dissemination of evidence to both clinicians and patients may send a market 
signal, albeit less efficiently than HTA non-approval, by rewarding drugs with better 
evidence through higher prescription rates.  
 There is a need for sustained improvement of mechanisms to disseminate knowledge 
and critical appraisal skills to clinicians, and ideally to those patients who are engaged 
with evidence.  
 Future efforts aimed at improving evidence dissemination should be reinforced by a frank 
discussion with patients on the strengths and weaknesses of evidence for surrogate and 
clinical outcomes.  
 In clinical practice guidelines, professional societies could prioritise clinicians 
communicating the benefits, risks, and harms of drugs to individuals, as well as the 
remaining uncertainties. 
 Patient groups should be encouraged to prioritise their existing work on encouraging 
patients to ask for evidence.  
 In line with best practice, clinicians should be encouraged to elicit and respect patients’ 
individual preferences to facilitate shared decision-making. 
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Table – Advantages and disadvantages of two alternative regulatory strategies that could 
improve the real-world therapeutic value of anti-diabetic drugs 
 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
Strategy 1:  
 
Higher evidence standards 
for approving new anti-
diabetic drugs by licensing 
agencies 
 
 
Only allow market entry of 
products that offer meaningful 
therapeutic benefit (i.e., 
equivalence to existing 
alternatives in terms of benefit 
and harm outcomes) 
 
Generate long-term evidence on 
comparative effectiveness in 
real-world populations in a 
timely manner before 
prescribing patterns are 
established 
 
Potential delays in market entry 
of new anti-diabetic 
medications  
 
High hurdle for the 
development of new therapies 
Strategy 2:  
 
Higher evidence standards 
for covering and 
reimbursing new drugs by 
national health technology 
assessment (HTA) agencies 
Maintain the existing evidence 
standards within licensing 
agencies 
 
Ensure that new drugs are 
approved by HTA agencies only 
when there is evidence of clear 
benefit on important outcomes 
(i.e., equivalence to existing 
alternatives in terms of benefit 
and harm outcomes) 
 
Under managed entry 
agreements (e.g., “approved for 
randomization”), ensure patient 
access to new medications 
while new evidence is 
generated 
Managed entry agreements are 
difficult to administer due to 
challenges in evidence 
generation in clinical practice, 
particularly for outcomes that 
are not routinely collected in 
electronic records 
 
Once new evidence is 
generated, changing the 
coverage status of a previously-
reimbursed drug, or 
withdrawing an already-
approved product, is politically 
challenging 
 
 
 
